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WHO CARRIES THE BURDEN OF PROVING CAUSATION IN AN 




American law serves as a means to establish a society in which all 
Americans have an opportunity to prosper and pursue happiness. 
Throughout the last century, American jurisprudence has identified 
various segments of the population that often times need extra protections 
to achieve these goals. This Article focuses on one particular class that 
has benefited greatly from becoming a protected class: ERISA plan 
participants and beneficiaries (together, “Plan Beneficiaries”).  
While employer-sponsored benefit plans began in the early 1900s as an 
informal medium through which employers showed their appreciation to 
long-time employees, modern-day employer-sponsored plans are much 
more regulated, most notably by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA” or “the Act”).1 In the words of the 
Department of Labor, 
ERISA protects the interests of employee benefit plan participants and their 
beneficiaries. It requires plan sponsors to provide plan information to 
participants. It establishes standards of conduct for plan managers and 
other fiduciaries. It establishes enforcement provisions to ensure that plan 
funds are protected and that qualifying participants receive their benefits, 
even if a company goes bankrupt.2 
According to the Department of Labor, as of 2013, “[ERISA] plans cover 
about 141 million workers and beneficiaries [in the United States], and 
include more than $7.6 trillion in assets. About 54 percent of America’s 
workers earn retirement benefits on the job, and 59 percent earn health 
benefits.”3  
Employees are incentivized to find employment that offers these 
benefits plans for many reasons. For one, these benefit plans offer strong 
safety nets in case the individual becomes ill or disabled. Moreover, these 
plans offer an almost effortless means to save for retirement through a 
401(k) plan or the like. 
Today, “ERISA does not require employers to provide pensions or 
 
 1. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001 et seq. 
 2. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: WHAT IS ERISA, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa 
[https://perma.cc/32QA-8TPE] [hereinafter DOL FACT SHEET]. 
 3. Id. 
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welfare benefit plans, but those that do must comply with its 
requirements.”4 In cases relating to employee benefit plans, ERISA 
usually preempts state law.5  The development of ERISA’s jurisprudence 
as well as other statutory developments, such as those within the Internal 
Revenue Code, make clear that employer-sponsored benefit plans are 
strongly valued and encouraged in the United States.6 In enacting ERISA, 
the drafters made their intent expressly clear—they sought to protect Plan 
Beneficiaries from unforeseen risks and exploitation.7 As Congress 
anticipated when it enacted ERISA, employer-sponsored benefit plans 
have indeed risen in popularity and are now common-place in the United 
States.  
Since 1974, ERISA-based litigation has flushed out much of the 
ambiguity within the provisions of the Act and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder; however, some ambiguities remain. This Article 
focuses on one remaining ERISA ambiguity: who carries the burden of 
proving causation in a section 409(a)8 suit for breach of fiduciary duty?   
The United States Circuit Courts are split on this question. The Sixth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the Plan Beneficiaries 
bringing the suit bear the burden of proving a causal link between the 
breach of fiduciary duty and the plan’s losses.9 As will be discussed, these 
Circuits’ approach is based on the presumption that, absent clear 
congressional intent, traditionally, a party bringing suit bears the burden 
of proving all elements of a claim, including causation (this Article refers 
to this approach as the “Traditional Approach”).10 The Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits disagree, holding that the burden of proving the 
absence of a causal link shifts to the plan fiduciary once the Plan 
Beneficiaries establish a prima facie case by showing breach of fiduciary 
duty and losses incurred by the plan (this Article refers to this approach 
as the “Burden-Shifting Approach”).11  
This Article reviews the two approaches and why various Circuit 
Courts have opted to implement one approach over the other. Part II 
outlines section 409(a) and explains its history and purpose within 
ERISA. In addition, Part II examines the previous rulings of various 
 
 4. PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34443, SUMMARY OF 
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) (2008) [https://perma.cc/5DUS-5XC9] 
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF ERISA]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(a) (stating that qualified plans “substantially affect the revenues of the 
United States because they are afforded preferential Federal tax treatment”). 
 7. See generally 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001. 
 8. ERISA § 409 is codified at 29 U.S.C.S. § 1109. 
 9. See infra Part II.D. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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Circuit Courts on this issue and discusses relevant Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Part III compares the two approaches and discusses the 
practical implications of each approach, respectively. Part IV then 
discusses various considerations, including previous Supreme Court 
ERISA jurisprudence and public policy considerations. Finally, Part V 
explains why the Supreme Court will most likely adopt the Burden-
Shifting Approach when it decides this question of law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Part provides a summary of ERISA’s purpose and the relevant 
statutory provisions to the circuit split in question. Further, this Part 
introduces the two approaches that have been adopted by various Circuit 
Courts in determining who carries the burden of proving breach of 
fiduciary duty under section 409(a) and examines each approach’s 
underlying rationale. 
A. ERISA Generally 
ERISA is crucial to the protection of Plan Beneficiaries. The Act was 
intended to protect presumably less sophisticated Plan Beneficiaries from 
exploitation and unnecessary risk over which they have no control. In fact, 
the ERISA drafters’ intent is expressly enumerated in the Act:  
[T]hat the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in 
recent years has been rapid and substantial; … that the continued well-
being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are 
directly affected by these plans; … that they have become an important 
factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful 
development of industrial relations; … that owing to the lack of employee 
information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is 
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries[.]12 
Each of these reasons shows that while employee benefit plans have, 
for many years, been considered a societal good, they have left Plan 
Beneficiaries open to potential mistreatment by sophisticated entities, 
such as plan administrators. Citing to the above reasons, the Act 
concludes that “it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and 
their beneficiaries … that minimum standards be provided assuring the 
equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.”13 Those 
minimum standards are set forth within ERISA. 
 
 12. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(a). 
 13. Id.  
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B. The Text of Section 409(a) and Other Relevant Sections 
ERISA section 409(a), in relevant part, reads: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of 
the . . . duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA] shall be personally 
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each 
such breach . . .14 
Section 3(21)(A) defines a “plan fiduciary” in the ERISA context: 
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent  
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan . . .,  
(ii) he renders investment advice . . .  with respect to any moneys or other 
property of such plan. . .  or  
(iii) he has any discretionary authority . . . in the administration of such 
plan.15 
Common examples of plan fiduciaries are plan trustees, plan sponsors, 
and members of a plan’s investment committee. Section 404(a)(1) 
imposes the following fiduciary duties on plan fiduciaries: (1) a duty of 
loyalty, (2) a duty of prudence, (3) a duty to diversify investments, and 
(4) a duty to follow plan documents to the extent that they comply with 
ERISA.16  
It is undisputed that ERISA provides a private right of action to Plan 
Beneficiaries of a qualified plan.17 Section 502(a)(2) provides that “a civil 
action may be brought . . . by the [Secretary of Labor], . . . by a participant 
[of a qualified plan], beneficiary [of a qualified plan] or fiduciary [of a 
qualified plan] for appropriate relief” for a breach of fiduciary duty under 
section 409(a) of the Act.18 
It is also undisputed that one element of a claim under section 409(a) 
is causation.19 The express language of section 409(a), which “imposes 
liability on a breaching fiduciary for ‘any losses to the plan resulting from 
each such breach,”20 makes clear that a claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
under section 409(a) requires a causal link between the breach of the duty 
and the plan’s losses.  
 
 14. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1109(a) (emphasis added). 
 15. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(21)(A) (emphasis added). 
 16. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1104; see also Summary of ERISA, supra note 4 at CRS-27.  
 17. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(2). 
 18. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(2). 
 19. See e.g., Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1336 
(10th Cir. 2017) (stating “causation is an element of the [section 409] claim”); Silverman v. Mut. Benefit 
Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (Jacobs, J. and Meskill, J., concurring) (stating that 
“[c]ausation of damages is . . . an element of the claim”). 
 20. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr., 858 F.3d at 1336 (emphasis added). 
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In sum, the interplay between sections 404, 409, and 502 are crucial to 
the achievement of ERISA’s goal of protecting Plan Beneficiaries. 
C. The Circuit Split 
As previously noted, within the context of section 409(a), there is a 
split among the Circuit Courts as to which party carries the burden of 
proving a causal link between the breach of fiduciary duty and a qualified 
plan’s losses. Currently, the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all 
hold that the Plan Beneficiaries bringing the suit bear the burden of 
proving causation (i.e., the “Traditional Approach”) while the Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits hold that the burden of disproving a 
causal link shifts to the fiduciaries once the beneficiary establishes a 
prima facie case by proving the other elements of a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim under section 409(a) (i.e., the “Burden-Shifting Approach”).21  
Not only do the approaches adopted by the two sides of the circuit split 
potentially result in different case outcomes, they are founded on 
completely opposite theories—the Traditional Approach is founded on 
the widely accepted legal theory that where proving causation is an 
element of a claim, the burden of proof is per se on the plaintiff, while the 
Burden-Shifting Approach is founded on the shifting burden theory found 
in the common law of trusts. 
1. The Traditional Approach 
The Traditional Approach, held by the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits, is premised in common law. In Pioneer Ctrs. Holding 
Co. ESOP & Tr., the Tenth Circuit expressly analyzed the issue of which 
party carries the burden in a section 409(a) breach of fiduciary duty suit. 
22 There, the court noted that section 409(a) “is silent as to who bears the 
burden of proving a resulting loss.”23 Therefore, in determining that the 
Plan Beneficiaries carry the burden of proving causation, the Tenth 
Circuit cited to Supreme Court jurisprudence for the proposition that the 
“ordinary default rule [is] that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove 
their claims.”24 The Tenth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that while there are a few exceptions to this default rule,25 in 
which case the burden may shift to the defendant, “[a]bsent some reason 
 
 21. See infra Part II.D.1-2. 
 22. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr., 858 F.3d at 1336. 
 23. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr., 858 F.3d at 1336. 
 24. Id. (quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)). 
 25. Id. (“There are exceptions to the default rule, such as when ‘certain elements of a plaintiff's 
claim . . . can fairly be characterized as affirmative defenses or exemptions.’”). 
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to believe that Congress intended otherwise, . . . the burden of persuasion 
lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.”26 In extending 
this default rule to the section 409(a) context, the Tenth Circuit gathered 
extra support from the general rules of evidence which state that the 
“burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and 
should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the 
present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to 
bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.”27 Citing these theories of 
law, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Traditional Approach. 
Although the other Circuit Courts that have adopted the Traditional 
Approach have not explicitly justified their positions in separate cases, 
those circuits have impliedly justified their positions using these same 
general rules.28 
2. The Burden-Shifting Approach 
The Burden-Shifting Approach, held by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits, is premised on the old common law of trusts.29  These 
Circuits hold that, while the general default rule may be that the plaintiff 
carries the burden of proving the elements of a claim, exceptions to this 
general rule exist.30 These Circuits hold that the common law of trusts 
provides one such exception:  
 
 26. Id. (quoting Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 at 57-58 for the rule that "while the normal default rule does 
not solve all cases, it certainly solves most of them . . . Absent some reason to believe that Congress 
intended otherwise, . . . the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief”). 
 27. Id. (quoting 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (2013)). 
 28. See, e.g., Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (Jacobs, J. 
and Meskill, J., concurring) (“An ERISA plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages under § 1105(a)(3) 
must show, inter alia, that the losses "resulted from" the defendant's failure to take reasonable steps to 
remedy the co-fiduciary's breach . . . Causation of damages is therefore an element of the claim, and the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving it.”); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir. 1995), 
abrogated by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014) (“[A] fiduciary's failure to 
investigate an investment decision alone is not sufficient to show that the decision was not reasonable. 
Instead, to show that an investment decision breached a fiduciary's duty to act reasonably in an effort to 
hold the fiduciary liable for a loss attributable to this investment decision, a plaintiff must show a causal 
link between the failure to investigate and the harm suffered by the plan . . . In order to establish this 
causal link, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an adequate investigation would have revealed to a 
reasonable fiduciary that the investment at issue was improvident”); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that, “[o]n remand, the burden of proof on the 
issue of causation will rest on the beneficiaries; they must establish that their claimed losses were 
proximately caused either by a failure by [the fiduciary] to cure [the second fiduciary’s] breach or knowing 
participation  by [the fiduciary] in [the second fiduciary’s] breach.”). 
 29. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr., 858 F.3d at 1335 (citing e.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (2012)); GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 871 (2d rev. ed. 1995 & Supp. 2013) ("If [a beneficiary] seeks damages, a part of his burden 
will be proof that the breach caused him a loss. . . . If the beneficiary makes a prima facie case, the burden 
of contradicting it . . . will shift to the trustee." (emphasis added)). 
 30. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57 (2005). 
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[t]rust law advocates a burden-shifting paradigm whereby once a 
beneficiary has succeeded in proving that the trustee has committed a 
breach of trust and that a related loss has occurred, the burden shifts to the 
trustee to prove that the loss would have occurred in the absence of the 
breach.31  
This exception recognizes the reality that the burden should be shifted to 
the plan fiduciary when the plan fiduciary possesses the relevant 
documents and knowledge needed to prove or disprove the element in 
question.32 
In short, proponents of the Burden-Shifting Approach believe that 
because most ERISA plans function at least similarly, if not identically, 
to common law trusts, the common law of trusts is applicable to modern-
day ERISA qualified plans.33 Following this line of thought, the Second,  
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have held that “once an ERISA plaintiff 
has proven a breach and a prima facie case of loss to the plan, the burden 
of persuasion shifts to the fiduciary to prove that the loss was not caused 
by the breach of duty.”34  
III. WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
ERISA is a federal statute. Consequently, the federal courts have 
subject matter jurisdiction over ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims.35 
ERISA explicitly allows eligible plaintiffs—the Secretary of Labor, a 
plan participant, beneficiary, or a fiduciary of a qualified plan36—to bring 
suit in a district court where the “[qualified] plan is administered, where 
the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found, and 
process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or 
may be found.”37 However, this theoretical permission to bring suit is 
significantly limited by forum selection clauses that are now 
commonplace in ERISA plans.38 Nevertheless, if ERISA Plan 
 
 31. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr., 858 F.3d at 1335 (internal quotations omitted). 
 32. See Brotherston v. Putnam Investments, LLC, 907 F.3d 17, 38 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Schaffer, 
546 U.S. 49, 60 (2005), the court stated “[t]hat exception recognizes that the burden may be allocated to 
the defendant when he possesses more knowledge relevant to the element at issue.”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1336 (quoting Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 362 (4th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887, 192 L. Ed. 2d 924 (2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 35. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(e). 
 36. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(e)(1). 
 37. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(e)(2). 
 38. At least three circuits—the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth—have now deemed forum selection 
clauses valid and enforceable in the ERISA context, finding that “selection clauses are consistent with 
ERISA’s venue statute, promote uniformity, and reduce litigation costs.” HEATHER M. MEHTA, SUPREME 
COURT AGAIN DENIES REVIEW OF ERISA FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES, 
https://www.greensfelder.com/employee-benefits-executive-compensation-blog/supreme-court-again-
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Beneficiaries can either prove their ERISA plan did not contain a forum 
selection clause or that said forum selection clause was unenforceable for 
any number of reasons, then Plan Beneficiaries could presumably bring 
suit in a federal district court of their choosing that satisfies the 
requirements laid out in section 1132(e).39 This broad language of section 
1132(e) along with the globalization of modern-day corporations leads to 
this circuit split being heavily emphasized.  
IV. THE COURT WILL LIKELY ADOPT THE BURDEN-SHIFTING APPROACH 
As alluded to earlier, this circuit split is prime for the Supreme Court 
to weigh in on. But, which of the two positions will the Court adopt? This 
Part dissects the language of section 409(a), analyzes relevant Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, analyzes the public policy and practical 
considerations relevant to the circuit split, and concludes that the Supreme 
Court will most likely adopt the Burden-Shifting Approach. Because the 
Circuit Courts that have analyzed this question of law have not placed 
much weight on the legislative history of section 409(a), this Article also 
does not pay homage to ERISA’s legislative history; instead, this Article 
analyzes the same considerations analyzed by the Circuit Courts that have 
confronted this question of law (i.e., the aforementioned considerations). 
A. Dissecting the Language of Section 409(a) 
For decades, a purely textual analysis of a statute’s text has been 
declared a starting point for statutory interpretation.40 In relevant part, 
section 409(a) states that when a plan’s fiduciary breaches an ERISA 
imposed fiduciary duty, that fiduciary is “personally liable to make good 
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach[.]41 In 
other words, for Plan Beneficiaries to recover, the plan’s losses must be 
caused by the breach of fiduciary duty. While section 409(a) clearly 
establishes that causation is an element of a section 409(a) claim, the 
language is not helpful in answering the question of who carries the 
burden of proving causation.  
 
denies-review-of-erisa-forum-selection-clauses [https://perma.cc/QZX3-7RKU]. 
 39. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(e). 
 40. See United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Statutory interpretation 
begins with the plain language of the statute . . . If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous, that 
meaning is controlling . . ..”) (internal citations omitted). 
 41. See 29 U.S.C.S § 1109(a) (emphasis added). 
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B. Forecasting the Supreme Court’s Position 
The Supreme Court’s ERISA jurisprudence is helpful in forecasting 
which approach the Court will adopt. Specifically, the Court’s 
jurisprudence within section 404—the provision within ERISA that 
establishes the relevant fiduciary duties—provides insightful guidance. In 
interpreting the fiduciary duty imposed on plan fiduciaries by section 404, 
the Supreme Court has consistently held that “the common law of trusts . 
. . informs the interpretation of [ERISA] fiduciary duties.”42 Recently, in 
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer,43 the Court discussed the 
appropriate method of interpreting the fiduciary duties under section 404 
and noted that because “[s]ection [404(a)(1)] imposes strict standards of 
trustee conduct . . . derived from the common law of trusts,” in interpreting 
the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA, a court should reference the old 
common law of trusts.44  
In essence, the Supreme Court has made clear that because ERISA 
fiduciary duties both derive from the common law of trusts and are 
modeled after the fiduciary duties in the common law of trusts, the 
common law of trusts is the touchstone in interpreting ERISA fiduciary 
duties and adjudicating breaches of the same. 
Within the section 409(a) circuit split, only the Burden-Shifting 
Approach makes reference to the old common law of trusts and pays 
homage to the Supreme Court’s instructions to use the common law of 
trusts to resolve ambiguities within ERISA.45 Because the Traditional 
Approach makes no reference to the old common law of trusts, it is likely 
that the Supreme Court will adopt the Burden-Shifting Approach.  
C. Public Policy Considerations 
Public policy considerations also support the adoption of the Burden-
Shifting Approach. As previously mentioned, one of ERISA’s explicit 
purposes is to protect Plan Beneficiaries from potential abuse stemming 
from sophisticated administrators.46 Applying this intent to the issue of 
who carries the burden of proving causation in a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim under section 409(a), it seems clear that the party who should carry 
the burden of proving or disproving causation is the party with better 
access to the documents and knowledge that can shed light on why the 
 
 42. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, n.4 (2008). 
 43. 573 U.S. 409, 428 (2014). 
 44. Id. at 416 (quoting Cent. States, S.E. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 
U.S. 559, 570 (1985)).  
 45. See supra Part II.D.2; see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502-07, 116 S.Ct. 1074-
5, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). 
 46. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
9
Rivin: Who Carries the Burden?
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
888 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
ERISA plan experienced losses.  
Proponents of the Traditional Approach would argue that public policy 
supports the Plan Beneficiaries carrying the burden of proving each 
element of the case, including causation, because that is the tradition.47 
However, these same considerations regarding tradition were ignored in 
the Supreme Court’s precedents analyzed previously. In other words, the 
Court appears to believe that a burden-shifting framework allocates the 
burden of proof in a more just manner and therefore is an exception to 
tradition. 
Proponents of the Traditional Approach would also argue that public 
policy supports the Plan Beneficiaries carrying the burden of proving each 
element of the case, including causation, because shifting the burden of 
disproving causation onto the administrator-fiduciary would discourage 
employers from offering an ERISA qualified plan in the first place 
because of the risks involved. But, this argument does not hold weight. In 
fact, the First Circuit expressly rejected this as a reason not to adopt the 
Burden-Shifting Approach.48 Furthermore, none of the Circuit Courts 
have cited to any empirical evidence that suggests shifting the burden 
discourages employers from offering ERISA qualified plans. 
In sum, the public policy considerations also support the Burden-
Shifting Approach because this approach accomplishes the goal of 
protecting Plan Beneficiaries who lack access to the type of information 
needed to establish causation within a section 409(a) breach of fiduciary 
duty lawsuit. 
V. WHAT’S NEXT? 
In March 2018, Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., 
N.A.49 was on the Supreme Court’s docket. The importance of this case 
was that in adjudicating the matter, the Tenth Circuit had no choice but to 
squarely confront the circuit split analyzed in this Article. In adopting the 
Traditional Approach, the Tenth Circuit noted that “[v]iewing the plain 
language, causation cannot fairly be characterized as [an] affirmative 
defense or exemption, but [rather it should be characterized as] an express 
element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under [section 409(a)]” 
and concluded that it saw “no reason to depart from the ordinary default 
 
 47. See, e.g., Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr., 858 F.3d at 1336. 
 48. Brotherston v. Putnam Investments, LLC, 907 F.3d 17, 38 (1st Cir. 2018) (the court stated that 
“it would be strange to reject trust law's rules on burden allocation in favor of an attempt to reduce 
employer costs, especially where the benefit of such a reduction would flow exclusively to employers 
whose breaches were followed by losses to the plan.”). 
 49. 858 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 2017). 
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rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.”50 On 
September 20, 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the case pursuant to a 
settlement reached by the parties.51 Although the settlement stopped the 
Court from having an opportunity to weigh in on the circuit split, the 
Court did show its willingness to grant certiorari on this question of law.  
The Supreme Court had another chance to settle this circuit split in 
Brotherston v. Putnam Investments, LLC.52 In Brotherston, the district 
court held that the class of Plan Beneficiaries failed to carry its burden of 
proving that the plan’s losses were caused by Putnam Investments, the 
plan administrator.53 Adopting the Burden-Shifting Approach, the First 
Circuit reversed the district court and held that “once an ERISA plaintiff 
has shown a breach of fiduciary duty and loss to the plan, the burden shifts 
to the fiduciary to prove that such loss was not caused by its breach, that 
is, to prove that the resulting investment decision was objectively 
prudent.”54 In supporting its conclusion, the First Circuit explained that, 
given the numerous investment options that plan fiduciaries have, it is 
unjust to make a plaintiff venture guesses as to what the fiduciary should 
have done; rather,   “[i]t makes much more sense for the fiduciary to say 
what it claims it would have done and for the plaintiff to then respond to 
that.”55 
 The Court denied certiorari in Brotherston on January 13, 2020,56 again 
missing an opportunity to settle the circuit split. Although the Court’s 
denial of certiorari means practitioners will have to wait for the Court to 
settle who carries the burden of proving causation under section 409(a), 
it can be argued that the Court’s denial of certiorari signifies the Court’s 
quasi acceptance of the First Circuit’s analysis and indirectly endorses the 
Burden-Shifting Approach.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
A resolution of this well-documented circuit split within ERISA 
section 409(a) is much needed and the Court would be justified in 
granting certiorari to review this question of law. Using the considerations 
discussed in this Article, the Court will most likely adopt the Burden-
Shifting Approach for section 409(a)’s causation element. Practically, this 
 
 50. Id. at 1336 (internal quotations omitted). 
 51. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 139 S. Ct. 50 
(2018). 
 52. 907 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 53. Id. at 23. 
 54. Id. at 39. 
 55. Id. at 38. 
 56. Brotherston v. Putnam Investments, LLC, 907 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, --- S.Ct. -
--- (U.S. January 13, 2020) (No. 18-926). 
11
Rivin: Who Carries the Burden?
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
890 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
means that ERISA administrators and fiduciaries would be well-advised 
to keep thorough records of their investment strategies and supporting 
documentation in order to rebut a claim of breach of fiduciary duty should 
the need ever arise.  
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